Public interest, Torstar and the Lange Cases by Cheer, U.
1 
 
Public interest, Torstar and the Lange Cases 
Notes for RNZ slot from Ursula Cheer (Associate Professor) Canterbury 
University, 24 February 2010. 
 
1. Wednesday, I want to discuss the very recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Torstar case.1
2. The New Zealand leading case in this area, the Lange case, was 
significantly influenced by the Canadian Charter and by the 
contemporaneous development of human rights jurisprudence in a number 
of jurisdictions. Now it seems the New Zealand jurisprudence has played 
a significant part in this recent development of Canadian defamation law. 
 This important decision has opened 
up the law of defamation for media in Canada. It also demonstrates nicely 
how common law systems of law are part of a robust process of 
fertilisation and cross-fertilisation of ideas, analysis and experience. The 
Supreme Court used a comparative analysis to reach its decision, by 
looking at developments elsewhere, including New Zealand. And in turn, 
this decision could influence where our law goes in the future. 
Background 
3. In New Zealand (and Canada), defamation is principally a civil wrong 
that gives the injured party a right to claim substantial damages. The 
action has been the branch of the law that the media fear most. Although 
my own work has demonstrated that concerns about the chilling effects of 
defamation law are somewhat overstated in New Zealand, it is true that 
damages in defamation cases can be high, especially if the plaintiff is a 
well-known person with a substantial reputation to lose. Defamation 
                                                          
1  Grant v Torstar Corp 2009 SCC 6, (22 December 2009). 
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proceedings can be unpredictable because not only are some of the rules 
vague, but also defamation trials are often with a jury, which must 
determine many of the important issues, sometimes with unexpected 
results. Furthermore, there are very technical rules of pleading requiring 
specialist legal advice. In general, the requirements of the tort are still 
regarded by some as overly plaintiff-friendly. 
4. The Defamation Act 1992 was an attempt to simplify and rationalise 
this branch of the law, but whether this object has been achieved remains 
unclear. Although the statute has refined certain elements of the law and 
offers some new remedies, it is still basically a common law subject, - for 
example, the definition of ‘defamation’ remains untouched. It is necessary 
to look to the case law, including that from the United Kingdom and 
Australia and other common law jurisdictions.  
5. Any privilege of the media to report statements that are untrue is 
a qualified privilege only. Here, the occasion, rather than the speaker or 
publisher, is protected. Thus, to attract common law qualified privilege, 
publication must be made only to persons who have an ‘interest or duty’ to 
receive it, which is known as the ‘shared interest test’. Usually excessive 
publication will not be privileged, and usually, national and international 
publication by the media is seen as excessive. Therefore, the most 
profound development in recent years in relation to defences in 
defamation has been the appearance of an extended form of qualified 
privilege in the Lange case, applying to a particular form of political 
statements which are published widely.  
6. In Lange v. Atkinson David Lange, former New Zealand Prime 
Minister and former leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, sued Mr 
Joe Atkinson, a lecturer in political studies at the University of Auckland, 
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and the publishers of the magazine, North and South, over an article and 
cartoon in which Mr Atkinson criticised Mr Lange’s record as prime 
minister and compared his performance as party leader unfavourably with 
that of current leaders. The defendant pleaded both ordinary qualified 
privilege and a new defence called political discussion, relying on 
Australian developments. By the time the case had gone to the High 
Court, the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal twice, we ended up with  
a generic privilege which attaches to subject-matter coming within the 
category of discussion about MPs past, present or future. However, it 
does not require an examination of the circumstances of publication (in 
particular, of media behaviour) in each case before determining whether 
the occasion is to be treated as one of qualified privilege (as was decided 
in the United Kingdom in a case called Reynolds). But in New Zealand, once 
the publication passes through the subject matter gateway, section 19 of 
the Defamation Act provides protection against press irresponsibility by 
mandating loss of the defence if ill will or misuse of the opportunity to 
publish exists. 
Torstar 
7. Given the incorporation of freedom of expression values into the 
law of defamation in Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, it is 
somewhat surprising that Canadian jurisprudence, which has exerted 
influence on our rights discourse, has been lagging behind. Torstar has 
changed all that, and in some areas, gone further, in part by seizing on 
and using the experience in the other common law countries.  
8. The Torstar decision is a model of clarity and Canadian pragmatism. 
In it, the Supreme Court of Canada modified the common law of 
defamation by creating a public interest defence which it called 
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‘responsible communication on matters of public interest.’ The case arose 
from statements contained in an article published by a newspaper about a 
private golf course development which a Mr Grant proposed to carry out 
on a large lakefront property on the Twin Lakes, Ontario. The article 
reported the views of local residents criticising the development and 
expressing suspicion that political influence had been exercised behind 
the scenes by Mr Grant. One resident was quoted saying ‘Everyone thinks 
it’s a done deal…’. The reporter had attempted to verify the facts and 
had sought comment from Mr Grant, who did not respond. Mr Grant sued 
the reporter, the newspaper and its affiliates and the resident quoted in 
the piece.  
9. The Supreme Court looked first at the arguments from principle. 
The three core rationales behind free speech theory were examined in 
the judgment – the argument from democracy, the Millian ideal of the 
marketplace of ideas, and the contribution to self-realisation of the 
individual. The first two were accepted as engaged where the media 
reports on matters of public interest. This was weighed against the 
competing value of protecting reputation and in a complementary sense, 
privacy. The pragmatism of the Court is apparent in its rejection of 
procedural objections and in its stated desire to create a defence that is 
workable and fair to both parties. It concluded ‘[w]hen proper weight is 
given to the constitutional value of free expression on matters of public 
interest, the balance tips in favour of broadening the defences available 
to those who communicate facts it is in the public’s interest to know.’ 
10.  The Supreme Court then found that a comparative analysis of case 
law developments in the other common democracies supported the same 
outcome. The Court looked at the situation in the USA, the United 
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Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Of New Zealand, the 
Court noted the Lange outcome might be narrower than the approach in 
the UK as to scope of privileged subject matter, but as perhaps offering 
stronger protection overall. Ultimately, though, New Zealand was lumped 
in with the other non-US jurisdictions in taking a middle path with a 
defence which allows ‘publishers to escape liability if they can establish 
that they acted responsibly in attempting to verify the information on a 
matter of public interest.’ This middle path is chosen by the Canadian 
court also.  
11. So Canada ended up with:  
• First, the defence is new and separate from the traditional qualified 
privilege defence; 
• Second, to ensure adaptability to new media, the defence is to apply to 
responsible communication on matters of public interest and is not tied to 
any concept of publication. The question of public interest is not to be 
determined in isolation, but in the context of the publication as a whole. 
No single definition of public interest is offered. However, it is not 
confined to discussion of government or political matters. The subject 
matter must invite public attention or substantially concern the public 
because it affects the welfare of citizens or attracts considerable public 
notoriety or controversy. This element is not to be characterised 
narrowly; 
• Lack of responsibility can destroy the defence. The factors looked at are 
the seriousness of the allegation, the public importance of the matter, 
the urgency of the matter, the status and reliability of the source, 
whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately 
reported, whether including the defamatory statement was justifiable, 
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whether the statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made 
rather than its truth (reportage) and a catch-all category of other 
considerations where relevant; 
12. The recognition of reportage is one area of significant overlap with UK 
law.  This means that where there is public interest in reporting what was 
said in the context of a dispute, and the report makes attribution 
preferably with identification, acknowledges it has not been verified, 
both sides of the dispute are set out fairly and the context is given, 
there is no need to verify and the repetition rule, whereby even those 
who just repeat what others have said can defame, is cast aside.  
Effects of Torstar in New Zealand 
13. Torstar has the potential to influence the law in New Zealand. The High 
Court rejected extension of the defence in the Peters v TVNZ case last 
year, but I believe that Lange qualified privilege is an embryonic public 
interest defence and would be seen this way if our higher courts consider 
the matter now in the light of Torstar. It is clear that the restriction of 
subject matter in Lange cannot be maintained on a principled basis, and in 
any event, is beginning to break down. The principled reasons for privileging 
statements about national or local politicians, for wishing to protect against 
potential chilling effects of defamation law in relation to that sort of 
discussion, must be the basic arguments about freedom of expression 
recognised in Torstar – the arguments from democracy and the marketplace 
of truth ideal. But those arguments also support a wider public interest 
defence.  
14. As to the conditions in which the Lange defence may be lost, I think that 
a series of guidelines such as those in Torstar can and should be developed 
7 
 
within the New Zealand approach of relying on s. 19 of the Defamation Act 
after a finding that occasion is privileged. Very few cases have tested any 
aspect of this in our jurisdiction. Certainly, nothing has ever been put to a 
jury. However, I think that some guidelines would assist in the application of 
the provision. The Torstar list is a good starting point. 
17. Finally, I think adopting the concept of reportage is a good idea too. 
Although successful use of it would be rare given the general character of 
media reporting currently, it is a defence which encourages both media 
responsibility and full reporting, thus serving freedom of expression while 
illustrating exactly the sort of ‘rights with responsibilities’ approach our 
judges appear to be interested in.  
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